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The Future of Dairy Cooperatives in




Agriculture plays a fundamental role in the U.S. economy as
a multibillion-dollar industry that feeds people all over the world.
However, over the past decade, the dairy industry in particular
has changed from a reliable sector of the greater agricultural in-
dustry into an unsettled, politically-charged, and fractured group.
Dairy farmers’ consistently receiving low milk prices has facili-
tated this divide.  Tired of being ignored and underpaid, dairy
farmers are demanding change in the current dairy market
structure.
Federal Milk Marketing Orders and a variety of statutes reg-
ulate the dairy industry, but the 1922 Capper-Volstead Act re-
mains the most notable piece of legislation in the dairy industry.
The Capper-Volstead Act provides antitrust exemptions for dairy
cooperatives to market, buy, and sell milk from member farmers
to processors and distributors.  A majority of the country’s dairy
farmers are members of a few exclusive dairy cooperatives, giv-
ing those cooperatives market dominance.  The Capper-Volstead
Act was effective but is no longer functioning as Congress origi-
nally intended.  As a result, dairy cooperatives have experienced
unfettered and unregulated growth and now manage the milk
supply and control almost every aspect of production from cow
to grocery store.
The types of cooperatives that qualify for antitrust protec-
tion are unclear, and very few court cases clarify how to control
the otherwise-autonomous cooperatives.  The Capper-Volstead
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Act desperately needs revisions to delineate the cooperatives’
roles and responsibilities and to grant a stronger supervisory role
to the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture.  Making these revisions
would help to ensure better cooperative practices and fairer milk
prices for dairy farmers.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. dairy industry is facing a crisis.1  Since 1970, 93 per-
cent of American dairy farms have closed due to an inability to
financially support their businesses, leaving only around 40,000
1. Dairy: Family Farmers in Crisis, FARMAID (August 16, 2018), http://bit.ly/
2Fde0C1 [https://perma.cc/NA6P-945J].
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dairy farms in the entire country—as opposed to nearly 640,000
dairy farms in 1970.2  If Congress does not take steps to fix the cur-
rent system in which the United States buys, processes, and sells
dairy products, those items will soon be scarce on grocery store
shelves.3
The modern dairy industry crisis is nothing new.  In 1922, Con-
gress enacted the Capper-Volstead Act4 in an effort to help Ameri-
can dairy farmers work together to receive a fair price for their
milk.5  However, while the Capper-Volstead Act was effective in its
early years, the failure to adjust it to the modern dairy industry and
to the cooperative system in which the industry currently operates
has allowed for the unchecked, anti-competitive growth of a select
group of dairy cooperative conglomerates.6  The conglomerates’
unmonitored growth and Congress’s failure to supervise the dairy
cooperatives’ increasingly anti-competitive practices have contrib-
uted significantly to the desperate, financially unstable situation in
which many American dairy farm families find themselves.7
Part II of this Comment will examine the history of the U.S.
dairy industry and the development of the country’s stance and pol-
icy regarding the legality of agricultural cooperatives.8  This exami-
nation will discuss the dairy industry’s general development9;
antitrust law’s growth in the United States and antitrust exemption
laws’ impact on agricultural cooperatives10; the Capper-Volstead
Act’s growth and its reception from the dairy farming community11;
the dairy industry’s current climate12; the structure, organization,
and method by which dairy cooperatives operate and control the
dairy supply system13; and the Capper-Volstead Act’s shortfalls.14
Part III of this Comment will recommend overhauling the Cap-
per-Volstead Act and revising §§ 1 and 2 of the Act.  The recom-
mended revisions offer clear and definitive language, including a
strict application of antitrust immunity qualifications under the
2. Id.
3. Id. As of July 2018, dairy farmers received milk prices about 30 percent
below the average cost of production. Id.
4. Capper-Volstead Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 291–292 (2018).
5. Infra Part II.C.
6. Supra note 1.
7. Id.
8. Infra Part II.
9. Infra Part II.A.
10. Infra Part II.B.
11. Infra Part II.C.
12. Infra Part II.D.
13. Infra Part II.D.
14. Infra Part II.E.
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Capper-Volstead Act.15  Additionally, increasing the U.S. Secretary
of Agriculture’s power strengthens dairy cooperative policing.16  In-
corporating supply management principles into future legislation
governing the dairy industry also provides a plausible solution to
the ongoing crisis.17  Understanding the development of the na-
tion’s dairy industry and the applicable antitrust laws is crucial to
reckoning with both the shortcomings and the needed improve-
ments of the Capper-Volstead Act.18
II. BACKGROUND
A. Agriculture in the United States
The dairy industry has been a fundamental part of the Ameri-
can agricultural system since the early 1600s, when Europeans im-
ported cattle into the early colonies.19  As education and
technology advanced in the 1800s, dairy farmers and industry spe-
cialists worked to improve milk production by trying to better un-
derstand genetics so as to advance dairy cattle’s development.20
Mass migrations of people from rural areas to urban areas spurred
the need for technological advancement because dairy products
now needed to be shipped longer distances from the rural farms to
city consumers.21  In 1895, the country’s dairy industry had become
so large that it required additional government support.22  The U.S.
government created the Dairy Division of the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA) to promote, to regulate, and to support the
American dairy farmer.23
Since the establishment of the United States, American farm-
ers have cooperated to produce, to market, to buy, and to sell agri-
cultural commodities; but the cooperation’s form has changed as
15. Infra Part III.A.2.
16. Infra Part III.A.3.
17. Infra Part III.B.
18. Infra Part II.E.
19. The American Dairy Industry: Early History, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. NAT’L
AGRIC. LIBRARY, http://bit.ly/2wX6AOU [https://perma.cc/B5P2-2XXX] (last vis-
ited June 10, 2019).
20. Id.
21. Id. (“Significant inventions such as commercial milk bottles, milking ma-
chines, tuberculin tests for cattle, pasteurization equipment, refrigerated milk tank
cars, and automatic bottling machines contributed towards making milk a healthful
and commercially viable product.”).
22. The American Dairy Industry: USDA Contributions to Dairying, U.S.
DEP’T OF AGRIC. NAT’L AGRIC. LIBRARY, http://bit.ly/2IoaXZT [https://perma.cc/
7B8R-XBUU] (last visited June 11, 2019).
23. Id.
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markets have modernized.24  A worker-operated store in England
was one of the earliest models of large-scale industry cooperation.25
The principles from this store’s operation carried over to the early
American cooperative models which drove modern cooperative
formation.26
In a market where individuals determine their actions based on
self-interest, the dairy farmer—the actual producer—will always re-
ceive the lowest milk price and see the smallest profit margins.27
The individual dairy farmer, operating as a single unit, has little-to-
no bargaining power relative to the middlemen’s bargaining power;
the dairy farmer must sell to the processing facility to get the prod-
uct to the consumer.28  Dairy farmers who act individually and at-
tempt to bargain with a distributor or processor operate at a
disadvantage because their “production and other activities have
such a small effect on total production that [they] must accept the
price and terms that buyers offer in the market.”29
24. David P. Claiborne, Comment, The Perils of the Capper-Volstead Act and
Its Judicial Treatment: Agricultural Cooperation and Integrated Farming Opera-
tions, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 263, 272 (2002).
25. Id.  Early American cooperative models “derive[ ] from a worker-oper-
ated store in Rochdale, England.” Id.
26. See id. (discussing the worker-operated store’s principles that were consid-
ered successful at generating cooperation to contribute positively to the business
model, including “participation according to contribution of goods (patronage),
business or services performed at cost with net returns paid to members based on
patronage (patronage dividends), democratic control (one person—one vote), lim-
ited dividends on capital investments, and ownership limited to patrons”).
27. See id. at 264.  Generally, farmers sell their product to a dairy processing
facility, which is then in charge of processing, bottling, packaging, and selling the
product to the store or entity for a certain price, which includes a mark-up so that
the processing facility earns a profit.  Telephone Interview with Jared Weeks,
Owner and Operator, Hun-Val Dairy Farm, LLC (Sept. 27, 2018).  The store or
entity then sells the product to the final consumer with an additional mark-up for a
profit margin at this stage as well. Id.  At the end, the milk price the consumer
pays and the milk price the farmer receives are widely different because a desire to
increase profit margins incentivizes the middleman (the processing facility) to act
in self-interest and to pay the farmer the least amount possible. Id.
28. See Claiborne, supra note 24, at 264.  Traditional commercial dairy farm-
ers have no choice but to sell their milk to a processing plant which pasteurizes and
homogenizes the milk before it can be sold to consumers.  Weeks Interview, supra
note 27; see also Mandatory Pasteurization for All Milk and Milk Products in Final
Package Form Intended for Direct Human Consumption, 21 C.F.R. § 1240.61
(2018).  Unless dairy farmers have facilities onsite to pasteurize their milk (which
most do not because of the high infrastructure cost and significant time require-
ment), they must sell to the processor who is free to use market power to charge
whatever milk price they choose.  Weeks Interview, supra note 27.
29. Claiborne, supra note 24, at 264–65; see also David L. Baumer et al., Cur-
dling the Competition: An Economic and Legal Analysis of the Antitrust Exemption
for Agriculture, 31 VILL. L. REV. 183, 195–201 (1986) (discussing buyers’ monop-
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In 1875, National Grange Convention30 attendees worked to
develop a policy that encouraged farmers to actively make an effort
to cooperate when bargaining with large-scale producers and buy-
ers.31  By the 1890s, business cooperation among American farmers
was a generally-accepted practice, but many farmers and industry
groups were unsure of what specific limits of cooperation the fed-
eral government would tolerate.32  The need for clarification, paired
with the demand for farmer cooperation protection, ultimately
spurred the development of antitrust law exemptions specific to the
U.S. agriculture industry.33
B. Antitrust Law Development in Agriculture
An opposition to monopolies has always, in some form, been
ingrained in the general principles that govern the free market; the
public interest demands that people and entities compete fairly.34
Opposition to unfair market practices by small and mid-size busi-
ness entities continues on the grounds that monopolies impair the
citizen’s ability to make the free choice to purchase the best prod-
uct at the price the citizen deems appropriate.35  The accompanying
price enhancement that flows from monopolies “seriously affects
the cost of living and is a matter that concerns adversely every indi-
vidual except the owner of the right to monopolize.”36
By the 1890s, unclear antitrust laws, which allowed for un-
restricted competition, failed to afford the average U.S. citizen an
equal opportunity to access wealth, services, and business opportu-
nities.37  Senator John Sherman led Congress in drafting a bill that
sony power in the market and how that power enables buyers to demand lower
prices and withhold purchases).
30. NATIONAL GRANGE: OF THE ORDER OF THE PATRONS OF HUSBANDRY,
http://bit.ly/2Xd8Tfr [https://perma.cc/6483-S2S7] (last visited June 11, 2019) (ex-
plaining that the National Grange Convention is a meeting of National Grange
members to discuss policy issues related to the American agricultural system).
31. Claiborne, supra note 24, at 273.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. RICHARD S. HARVEY & ERNEST W. BRADFORD, A MANUAL OF THE FED-
ERAL TRADE COMMISSION 72 (1916) (ebook).
35. See id.
36. Id.  This sentiment forms the foundation from which this Comment will
explore the restraints and negative implications that the Capper-Volstead Act
places on both the individual dairy producers and the consumers. See infra Part II.
37. See id. (describing the shift in power when independent groups combined,
leaving a small number of multi-level firms controlling and marking off certain
areas of trade for exclusive control).  The Standard Oil Company was able to extin-
guish any competition based on its sheer size alone; smaller competitors could not
match the time or expenses to keep up with the monopolist. Id.
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aimed to protect farmers against the “unfair methods of competi-
tion in commerce.”38  Price-fixing and output-control agreements
are the two most damaging practices of monopolies; and, in 1890, in
an effort to control those two practices, Congress enacted the Sher-
man Antitrust Act, which has continued to be a linchpin of antitrust
law governing modern markets and economies in the 21st
Century.39
1. The Sherman Act and Milk Antitrust Litigation
Contemporary dairy cooperative antitrust litigation focuses on
claims that allege violations of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust
Act.40  A claim under § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act “must al-
lege ‘(1) concerted action, (2) by two or more persons that (3) un-
reasonably restrains trade.’”41  Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust
Act “makes it unlawful for any person to monopolize, attempt to
monopolize, or conspire with another to monopolize, trade.”42  A
claim under this section must allege “(1) proof of a concerted action
deliberately entered into with the specific intent to achieve an un-
lawful monopoly, and (2) the commission of an overt act in further-
ance of the conspiracy.”43
A plaintiff can present an antitrust violation claim by alleging
that the defendant, by way of either horizontal or vertical integra-
38. Id. at 74–76.
39. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012); see Claiborne, supra note
24, at 273–275.  The Supreme Court has defined monopoly as “‘the power to con-
trol prices or exclude competition.’”  United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563,
571 (1966) (quoting United States v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377,
391 (1956)).
40. See Md. & Va. Milk Producers Ass’n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458, 460
(1960) (discussing allegations of violations of § 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act);
Food Lion, LLC v. Dean Foods Co. (In re Se. Milk Antitrust Litig.), 739 F.3d 262,
268 (6th Cir. 2014) (discussing allegations of Sherman Antitrust Act violations via
unlawful merger); Allen v. Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc., 748 F. Supp. 2d 323, 330
(D. Vt. 2010) (discussing allegations of violations of Sherman Antitrust Act §§ 1
and 2 via conspiracy to fix prices); Agritronics Corp. v. Nat’l Dairy Herd Ass’n, 914
F. Supp. 814, 818 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (same); Ewald Bros., Inc. v. Mid-America
Dairymen, Inc., 877 F.2d 1384, 1385 (8th Cir. 1989) (discussing allegations of Sher-
man Antitrust Act violations via the Cooperatives Working Together Program);
Alexander v. Nat’l Farmers Org., 687 F.2d 1173, 1179 (8th Cir. 1982) (discussing
allegations of Sherman Antitrust Act violations); Fairdale Farms, Inc. v. Yankee
Milk, Inc., 635 F.2d 1037, 1038 (2d Cir. 1980) (same); Kinnett Dairies, Inc. v.
Dairymen, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 608, 611 (M.D. Ga. 1981) (same).
41. Allen, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 332 (quoting In re Nine W. Shoes Antitrust Li-
tig., 80 F. Supp. 2d 181, 190 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)).
42. Fairdale Farms, Inc., 635 F.2d at 1040; see also AD/SAT v. Associated
Press, 181 F.3d 216, 233 (2d Cir. 1999).
43. Allen, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 332.
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tion, illegally conspired to monopolize and restrain trade.44  Hori-
zontal restraint of trade occurs when competitors who are at the
same level within the market enter into agreements, and vertical
restraint of trade occurs when entities or competitors at different
levels of the market enter into agreements.45  Courts analyze claims
of horizontal illegal conspiracy under the per se rule, which pro-
vides that the accused’s actions are illegal when they are clearly un-
reasonable in their anticompetitive efforts.46  However, in recent
years, courts have been hesitant to apply the per se rule and have
agreed to reserve it for only clear-cut cases of restraint of trade.47
The other standard under which courts analyze antitrust claims
is the rule of reason analysis.48  When a plaintiff alleges a vertical
restraint of trade, and now, occasionally, when a plaintiff alleges a
horizontal restraint of trade, courts use the rule of reason analysis.49
This analysis requires the plaintiff to “show that the restraint pro-
duced anticompetitive effects within the relevant product and geo-
graphic markets.”50  No matter which type of restraint of trade
allegation appears in the complaint, the plaintiff must also suffi-
ciently plead and demonstrate an injury suffered as a direct result
of the alleged restraint of trade.51
44. Sweetwater Valley Farm, Inc. v. Dean Foods Co. (In re Se. Milk Antitrust
Litig.), 801 F. Supp. 2d 705, 718–19 (E.D. Tenn. 2011); see also Crane & Shovel
Sales Corp. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 854 F.2d 802, 805 (6th Cir. 1988) (“Courts have
discerned two major types of antitrust conspiracies to restrain trade: horizontal
and vertical.”).
45. Sweetwater Valley Farm, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 718–19.  A level within the
marketplace references a stage in the market, i.e., production, processing, market-
ing, or distribution. Food Lion, LLC, 739 F.3d at 272.
46. Sweetwater Valley Farm, Inc., 801 F. Supp. 2d at 719.  “The per se rule
should be applied only in ‘clear cut cases’ of trade restraints that are so unreasona-
bly anticompetitive that they present straightforward questions for reviewing
courts.” Id. (citing NHL Players Ass’n. v. Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club, 325
F.3d 712, 718 (6th Cir. 2003)).
47. Id. at 718.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Food Lion, LLC, 739 F.3d at 270 (explaining that the courts must use the
rule of reason to analyze the product market to look for anticompetitive injury
when manufacturers and distributors agree to cooperate).  Courts must use this
fact-specific analysis because the courts do recognize that some vertical agree-
ments between entities at different stages of the process can have redeeming quali-
ties, like distribution efficiencies. Id.
51. Id.
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C. Implementation of the Capper-Volstead Act
In the early 1900s, small, family-operated dairy farms domi-
nated the U.S. agricultural landscape.52  Dairy farming was a stable,
no-risk career choice because everyone drank milk and used but-
ter.53  After World War I, demand for fluid milk fell, and dairy
farmers received drastically reduced amounts in their milk checks.54
In 1908 and 1911, two federal courts found that the Sherman Anti-
trust Act prohibited “combinations of labor” as well as “combina-
tions of capital.”55  These court decisions solidified the fear that
farmers would be next to face federal prosecution, deterring dairy
farmers from forming and participating in cooperative organiza-
tions.56  Farmer outcry demanded fair and stable milk prices as well
as improved product processing and marketing.57
In response to this outrage, Congress passed supplemental leg-
islation to clarify the Sherman Antitrust Act and to exempt farmer
52. See Peter Carstensen, Agriculture Cooperatives and the Law: Obsolete
Statutes in a Dynamic Economy, 58 S.D. L. REV. 462, 462 (2013).
53. Telephone interview with Peter Carstensen, Professor of Law Emeritus,
University of Wisconsin Law School (Jul. 11, 2018) (discussing the dairy industry’s
relatively low barriers to entry).  In the early 1900s, becoming a dairy farmer was
considered a respectable career and gave families a desirable way to raise their
families; and, as a result, many small, family-run dairy farms emerged across the
country. Id.
54. Id. The milk check reflects the price per 100 pounds of milk shipped and
multiplied out depending on the total pounds of milk that farmer produced and
shipped.  Weeks Interview, supra note 27.  If the price per 100 pounds is reduced,
even if production remains the same, the farmer will ultimately receive a smaller
paycheck. Id.
55. Claiborne, supra note 24, at 275; Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 302
(1908); Steers v. United States, 192 F. 1, 1 (6th Cir. 1911).  Combinations of capital
and labor occur when a group of individuals pool their assets and resources to
increase their collective bargaining power.  Claiborne, supra note 24, at 275.
56. Claiborne, supra note 24, at 275; see also Fairdale Farms, Inc. v. Yankee
Milk, Inc., 635 F.2d 1037, 1040 (2d Cir. 1980).  “A cooperative can be defined as a
legal business entity created under state law that is owned and operated for the
purpose of benefiting those individuals who use its services.”  Cooperatives—An
Overview, THE NAT’L AGRIC. L. CTR., http://bit.ly/2WPrCcM [https://perma.cc/
D5SV-U42F] (last visited on June 11, 2019).  Generally, a cooperative embodies
four unique principles, “(1) it is owned and democratically controlled by the indi-
viduals that use its services; (2) the returns that its members receive on their indi-
vidual financial investments into the cooperative are limited; (3) it is financed
mostly by its members and those who use the cooperative; and (4) it distributes net
margins to its members in proportion to their use of the cooperative.” Id.
57. Carstensen, supra note 52, at 465.  The small-scale cooperation that had
been taking place quickly vanished with the introduction of antitrust law.  Id.
Farmers were fearful of prosecution but felt that their lacking the ability to band
together caused the large processors and marketing companies to easily dominate
them. Id.
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cooperatives from antitrust prosecutions.58  In 1914, Congress
passed the Clayton Act in an attempt to provide antitrust law pro-
tection for private agricultural cooperatives.59  The Clayton Act
permitted the formation of labor, agricultural, and horticultural or-
ganizations, which seemingly covered farmer cooperatives.60  How-
ever, dairy farmer cooperatives began once again to fear federal
prosecution for cooperation because the Clayton Act did not define
the types of activities in which cooperatives could legally participate
and engage.61
In a third attempt to protect agricultural operations and clarify
agricultural cooperative protection, Congress enacted the Capper-
Volstead Act in 1922.62  Congress “wanted and expected farmers to
be represented by strong and effective cooperatives . . . [to afford
the farmers the] same ‘unified competitive advantage’ available to
businessmen acting through corporations.”63  Congress’s intention
in enacting the Capper-Volstead Act was “to permit agricultural
producers to join together to process, prepare, and market agricul-
tural products without fear of prosecution under the antitrust
laws.”64  Congress hoped to provide protection for the farmers who
needed assistance in navigating the market and in protecting their
economic interests.65
The Capper-Volstead Act grew out of farmers’ dissatisfaction
with the Clayton Act.66  Farmers and industry leaders continued to
lobby for additional legislation that would provide clearer and
58. See Carla Tolbert Cook, Note, Antitrust Action Against Milk Marketing
Cooperatives—Shaking Up the Milk Industry, 34 DRAKE L. REV. 493, 495 (1984).
59. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (2012); see also Cook, supra note 58, at
495 (discussing that § 16 of the Clayton Act, which is the specific section that pro-
vides for cooperative protection, was the result of Congress again being asked to
consider an exemption for farmer cooperatives).
60. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2012); see also Carstensen, supra note 52, at
464.
61. Claiborne, supra note 24, at 276 (discussing that farmers perceived the
Clayton Act to be unsatisfactory because it failed to truly protect cooperatives’
customary practices).  Industry leaders and cooperative executives soon realized
the Clayton Act’s shortcomings and continued their efforts to demand additional
clarification and protection for agricultural cooperatives. Id.
62. Capper-Volstead Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 291–292 (2018); see also Cook, supra
note 58, at 496.
63. Fairdale Farms, Inc. v. Yankee Milk, Inc., 635 F.2d 1037, 1043 (2d Cir.
1980) (citing Md. and Va. Milk Producers Ass’n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458, 466
(1960)).
64. United States v. Dairymen, Inc., 660 F.2d 192, 194 (6th Cir. 1981).
65. Nat’l Broiler Mktg. Ass’n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816, 827–28 (1978).
66. Claiborne, supra note 24, at 276.  The American Farm Bureau, founded in
1920, set up an office in Washington, D.C., to better advocate for improved legisla-
tion. Id.
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stronger protections for farmers and their agricultural coopera-
tives.67  The Capper-Volstead Act went through two years of floor
debates, amendments, and deliberations before President Harding
ultimately signed and enacted it on February 18, 1922.68
The Capper-Volstead Act provides, in § 1, antitrust immunity
for people, cooperatives, or entities who are:
engaged in the production of agricultural products as farmers,
planters, ranchmen, dairymen, nut or fruit growers [and permits
them to] act together in associations, corporate or otherwise,
with or without capital stock, in collectively processing, preparing
for market, handling, and marketing in interstate and foreign
commerce, such products of persons so engaged.69
Congress also included requirements that the cooperatives
must follow to receive Capper-Volstead Act protection.70  To re-
ceive the protection, the cooperative must:  (1) be “operated for the
mutual benefit of the members,” (2) not “allow[ ] [a member] more
than one vote because of the amount of stock or membership capi-
tal he may own,” (3) limit the amount of dividends that can be paid,
and (4) deal primarily in the products of its members.71
Section 2 of the Capper-Volstead Act authorizes the U.S. Sec-
retary of Agriculture to order any cooperative found to have “un-
duly enhanced” any agricultural product’s price to cease and
desist.72  The USDA does not provide any guidance as to who pro-
tected individuals are or which activities or business practices qual-
67. VICTORIA SAKER WOESTE, THE FARMERS BENEVOLENT TRUST: LAW
AND AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA 1865-1945, at 157
(1998) (explaining the importance of agriculture advocate groups—including the
American Farm Bureau, the National Milk Producers Federal, the National
Grange, and the National Farmers Union—in lobbying for the passage of legisla-
tion, which ultimately resulted in Congress’s passing the Capper-Volstead Act).
68. See Claiborne, supra note 24, at 281–87 (discussing the numerous floor
debates that centered around who would be entitled to Capper-Volstead Act pro-
tection and who would monitor and enforce the Capper-Volstead Act’s provision).
Ultimately, Congress settled on limiting protection to producers and gave monitor-
ing and enforcement powers to the Secretary of Agriculture. Id.
69. Capper Volstead Act, 7 U.S.C. § 291 (2012).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Capper Volstead Act, 7 U.S.C. § 292 (2012).  The U.S. Secretary of Agri-
culture may order the cooperative to “cease and desist” engaging in unfair busi-
ness practices that result in a burdensome price increase for the consumer.
Fairdale Farms, Inc. v. Yankee Milk, Inc., 635 F.2d 1037, 1040 (2d Cir. 1980).
These activities might include price-fixing agreements, output control agreements,
or other market-manipulating agreements or plans that have the effect of binding a
majority of the market to one pricing and production structure.  Id.
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ify.73  The USDA does not impose any cooperative size limits, so
agricultural cooperatives and their member farmers are left to de-
termine for themselves which people and what activities qualify for
Capper-Volstead Act protection.74
D. Current Climate of U.S. Dairy Industry Competition
Additional legislation and government programs play a role in
cooperatives’ growth and in the dairy industry’s function in the U.S.
economy.75  Understanding the milk price calculation model is criti-
cal to understanding the current state of the dairy industry climate
and market, as well as the general interplay between modern coop-
eratives and the milk price structure.
1. The U.S. Dairy Industry Structure
The modern dairy farmer faces a different climate today than
he faced 50 years ago.76  Currently, dairy farmers are struggling to
generate revenue that exceeds their monthly operating costs.77  The
convoluted, complex, and mysterious dairy pricing system is not
helping either.78  Dairy farmers find it nearly impossible to plan
ahead with certainty for future expenses or bad months because
they can never be certain about the price they will actually receive
for the amount of milk they ship each month.79
73. Carstensen, supra note 52, at 467.
74. 7 U.S.C. § 455 (2012); see also Carstensen, supra note 52, at 467.  To
strengthen the Capper-Volstead Act protections, Congress passed the Cooperative
Marketing Act in 1926 to explicitly authorize “the sharing and coordination of
marketing information among cooperatives.” Id.
75. Carstensen, supra note 52, at 469.
76. Weeks Interview, supra note 27 (discussing the current state of the mar-
ket, the procedures he runs through as a business owner, and the challenges he is
currently facing).
77. Id. (explaining that the cost of raising, feeding, and caring for his herd of
dairy cows exceeds his milk check at the end of each month).
78. Id. (discussing the complex and mysterious method that is used to deter-
mine the price per 100 pounds of milk).  The system’s unpredictable nature makes
it hard for dairy farmers to plan ahead when it comes to determining when to
make big purchases, such as new equipment, and when to save money in anticipa-
tion of a poor milk check. Id.
79. Id. (describing the system used by the industry to pay dairy farmers).  A
trucking company picks up dairy farmers’ milk according to a regularly scheduled
time. Id.  This time can be every other day, every day, or sometimes twice a day;
after pick-up, the truck takes the milk to the designated processing plant. Id.  The
farmers do not receive their milk check until the end of the following month. Id.
That check represents the price of milk paid out per 100 pounds produced, minus
cooperative fees, trucking fees, and other miscellaneous expenses. Id.  The
amount left over (usually around two dollars less than the starting pay price per
100 pounds) becomes the mailbox milk price, which is the actual milk price farm-
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Dairy farmers’ membership in a cooperative is a choice, but
many farmers find it hard to turn down the security and marketing
power that a large cooperative offers.80  Dairy Farmers of America
(DFA), the largest dairy cooperative in the United States, has over
18,000 members located across the country.81  DFA also “owns
thirty-one plants that process milk into a wide range of products,
has joint ventures with a number of large food manufacturers, and
reported $13 billion in revenue.”82  At one point, DFA member
farmers produced approximately 35.8 billion pounds of milk
annually.83
2. Modern Dairy Cooperatives
Modern dairy cooperatives have typically operated in the mar-
ket in one of three ways:  “(1) vertically integrated processors of
members’ products, (2) intermediaries that market their members’
products, or (3) bargaining agents on behalf of their members with
buyers for process and other terms that the buyer will observe in
obtaining the agricultural products directly from the members.”84
However, since the 1960s, a fourth operating method has developed
for the modern agricultural cooperative.85  Cooperatives now oper-
ate as pure cartels within the system and are:
vertically integrated from production to direct sales of finished
goods.  The “cooperative” provides a forum in which the “mem-
bers” agree on the prices or other terms they will charge their
buyers.  This approximates a pure cartel in which the cooperative
ers receive for their product. Id.  Dairy farmers do not know what their mailbox
price will be until the end of the following month. Id.
80. Id. (explaining that not all dairy farmers are mandated to be cooperative
members).  Dairy farmers may elect either to sell their milk through a cooperative
or to contract privately with a processing plant. Id.  Once a dairy farmer is a mem-
ber of the cooperative, the cooperative must pick up the milk from the farmer and
then market and sell it. Id.  The benefit of joining a cooperative is that the cooper-
ative cannot drop the farmer from the business like a processing plant can. Id.
Although processing plant contracts may yield slightly higher prices per 100
pounds of milk, the processing facilities have the discretion to terminate contracts
at any time. Id.  The individual dairy producers must bargain for themselves to
find a new processor, a task that is exceedingly difficult in the modern market. Id.
The security of guaranteed pick-up and collective bargaining power has made co-
operatives so popular and persistent, despite their current flaws. Id.
81. Carstensen, supra note 52, at 479.
82. Id.
83. CARL E. ZURBORG, A HISTORY OF DAIRY MARKETING IN AMERICA 209
(2005).
84. Carstensen, supra note 52, at 472.
85. Id.
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only provides a vehicle for the parties to agree how they will
compete with each other.86
When cooperatives act as processors, they act similarly to other
business entities.87  Some of these processor cooperatives have de-
veloped well-recognized brand names, such as Land O’Lakes, that
bring added value to the product.88  Before the Capper-Volstead
Act, the U.S. government treated dairy farmer cooperatives as un-
lawful and consistent with exclusionary market practices.89  How-
ever, these types of cooperatives have expanded and flourished
because of the Capper-Volstead Act.90
When cooperatives act as sales agents or intermediaries, they
are known as cooperatives serving as marketing agents.91  The co-
operatives can handle the milk from farmer to processor, which ul-
timately brings more value to the member.92  In the alternative,
cooperatives can simply serve as bargaining agents and negotiate
the direct sale of milk from farmers to buyers.93  Offsetting this role
as bargaining agent provides the opportunity for downstream buy-
ers who want to look for cheaper prices to engage in negotiations
with noncooperative members.94  If cooperatives were to demand
excessive prices, downstream buyers would contract easily with
noncooperative members at a lower but reasonable price.95
86. Id.
87. Id. (describing a processor’s role as one which incorporates the many
levels of moving the product from farm to consumer, including buying from farm-
ers, processing—which includes pasteurization and homogenization, and reselling
to the outlet by which the product will reach consumers).
88. Id. at 472–73.  Processor-cooperatives developing well-known brand
names is not a phenomenon limited to the dairy industry. Id. at 472.  This phenom-
enon has resulted in the development of the Sunkist, Sun Maid, Welch’s, and
Ocean Spray brands. Id.
89. Id. at 473.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 474.  The additional value stems from the logistics and expensive
processing and bottling procedure.  Weeks Interview, supra note 27.  Cooperatives
choose to handle those aspects rather than require the dairy farmer to develop
such infrastructure and network to complete all of the intermediary steps to get the
milk on the grocery store shelf. Id.
93. Id. Cooperatives that operate this way function much like unions and are
responsible for negotiating “contracts that cover their members’ transactions with
the buyers.” Id.
94. Carstensen, supra note 52, at 474. Finding dairy farmers who are not part
of a cooperative, however, is increasingly rare.  Weeks Interview, supra note 27.
Without noncooperative members who are not bound by the prices cooperatives
set, downstream buyers struggle to find anyone willing and able to negotiate for a
cheaper purchase price than what the cooperatives offer.  Carstensen, supra note
52, at 474.
95. Carstensen, supra note 52, at 474.
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The support for this theory stemmed from the dairy industry’s
low barriers to entry, but such low barriers are hardly the case
now.96  The present high barriers to entry have caused concern for a
cooperative’s ability to artificially manipulate milk prices without
the threat of easily accessible, noncooperative members for the
downstream buyers to seek out if they want to bargain for a differ-
ent milk price.97
3. Federal Milk Marketing Orders
Though not often mentioned in Capper-Volstead Act litigation
or analysis, crucial in understanding dairy cooperatives’ unique
power is the Federal Milk Marketing Orders’ (FMMOs) basic struc-
ture.98  The Agricultural Adjustment Act gave the U.S. Secretary of
Agriculture authority to set up and utilize the Federal Milk Market-
ing Order Programs.99  The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act
of 1937 amended the Agricultural Adjustment Act and is the legal
foundation for modern FMMOs.100  FMMOs regulate processors
and handlers in defined geographic marketing areas by using audits
to ensure they implement proper procedures.101  The FMMOs also
96. Weeks Interview, supra note 27.  Currently, building new infrastructure is
the highest cost of constructing a new facility. Id.  New infrastructure often re-
quires loans that end up coming from a government lending agency because banks
are extremely hesitant to make large loans to a start-up dairy farm given the vola-
tility and unpredictability of the dairy market. Id.  High infrastructure cost is in
addition to the cost of purchasing cattle (both milk cows and young stock), equip-
ment, feed, milking equipment, and basic care equipment. Id.  Dairy farmers’ in-
ability to find a market in which to ship their milk makes it even more difficult to
enter the industry as a new farmer. Id. Record low milk prices have been consis-
tent for some time; and, as a result, cooperatives and private processors alike are
unwilling—and simply financially unable—to take on new farmers. Id. These co-
operatives and private processors struggle to market and sell the milk they already
agreed to take. Id.
97. Carstensen, supra note 52, at 474; see also Weeks Interview, supra note 27
(explaining that starting up a new dairy farm is extremely difficult, so the likeli-
hood that new farmers will enter the market as nonmembers who can bargain in-
dependently for different, lower prices with downstream buyers is increasingly
low).
98. Carstensen, supra note 52, at 469; see also United States v. Borden Co.,
308 U.S. 188, 191 (1939).
99. Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, 7 U.S.C. § 602 (2012); see
also ZURBORG, supra note 83, at 168.
100. ZURBORG, supra note 83, at 168.
101. Id. at 175; see also Carstensen, supra note 52, at 471.  FMMOs establish
certain provisions under which dairy processors purchase fresh milk from dairy
farmers supplying a marketing area. Federal Milk Marketing Orders, UNITED
STATES DEP’T OF AGRIC.: AGRIC. MARKETING SERVICES, http://bit.ly/2RldV3P
[https://perma.cc/2GK6-QPEL] (last visited June 11, 2019).  Federal order provi-
sions refer to dairy processors as handlers and dairy farmers as producers. Id.  A
marketing area is generally defined as a geographic area where handlers compete
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have the power to regulate commodities’ grading.102  The unique
feature of FMMOs is that the cooperative receives the proxy votes
of all its member farmers when it operates within one such order.103
If a cooperative can get enough individual farmers in an
FMMO to become cooperative members, the cooperative can con-
trol the majority of votes in that marketing area and create regula-
tions or policies that favor its business organization.104  Even if
those policies are contrary to the individual members’ interests, the
cooperative can still enact policies by controlling a majority of the
proxy votes.105  For example, cooperatives can enact policies that
restrict output or limit product sales to certain markets, even if
members would prefer to increase output.106
However, to incentivize membership to gain proxy votes, coop-
eratives can also enact policies that create better avenues for selling
dairy products, allowing members to receive better milk prices and
incentivizing additional membership.107  These policies leave out
nonmembers, who either leave the industry or join the cooperative,
creating a cycle that leads to cooperative dominance in the
marketplace.108
E. Capper-Volstead Act Tensions
The lack of clarity regarding the Capper-Volstead Act’s limited
restrictions and the courts’ failure to provide clear, practical gui-
dance that satisfies individual farmers’ concerns create major ten-
sions in the U.S. dairy industry.109  Litigants use the Capper-
Volstead Act as an affirmative defense:  plaintiffs file claims alleg-
for packaged fluid milk sales, although other factors may be considered when de-
termining the boundaries of a marketing area. Id. The FMMOs “serve to main-
tain stable marketing relationships for all handlers and producers supplying
marketing areas, thus facilitating the complex process of marketing fresh milk.”
Id.
102. For example, fluid milk is USDA Grade A, while milk used for making
cheese is USDA Grade B.  Weeks Interview, supra note 27.
103. Carstensen, supra note 52, at 471.  The individual farmers located and
operating within a defined region control the FMMOs within that same region. Id.
104. Id. at 472.  The cooperative controls the majority of votes because it re-
ceives the proxy vote of farmers who join. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.  By incentivizing membership with favorable policies, such as more
efficient distribution methods and improved milk prices, cooperatives make it
more likely that farmers in their marketing area join. Id.
108. Id.
109. Weeks Interview, supra note 27 (explaining that dairy farmers are frus-
trated with the lack of change in dairy cooperatives’ practices, even though many
dairy farmers have attempted to bring light to the manipulation by filing lawsuits).
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ing Sherman Antitrust Act violations, and defendants respond by
stating that the Capper-Volstead Act’s exemptions protect them
from liability.110  Recent court cases have focused on cooperative
actions that affect the supply and price of milk.111
1. Supply Management Versus Price-Fixing Agreements
Dairy cooperatives that qualify for Capper-Volstead Act im-
munity can engage in price-fixing agreements with other dairy co-
operatives.112  These agreements may not, however, extend to
conduct that would restrain trade, suppress competition, or fall
“outside the ‘legitimate objects’ of a cooperative.”113  The Capper-
Volstead Act’s vague language—coupled with the few cases that ac-
tually ask the question, “What can dairy cooperatives do?”—lends
itself to unclear interpretation.114
Tensions arise because courts typically interpret the Capper-
Volstead Act’s language to permit cooperatives or associations of
110. See, e.g., In re: Fresh & Process Potatoes Antitrust Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d
1141, 1150 (D. Idaho 2011).
111. Infra Part II.E.3
112. Allen v. Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc., 748 F. Supp. 2d 323, 344–46 (D. Vt.
2010) (“[The Capper-Volstead Act] grants dairy cooperatives antitrust immunity
with respect to price-fixing agreements with other dairy cooperatives. . .”); see also
Nat’l Broiler Mktg. Ass’n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816, 822 (1978).
113. Allen, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 345 (citing Md. & Va. Milk Producers Ass’n v.
United States, 362 U.S. 458, 468 (1960)).  A recently settled, high-profile case dealt
with allegations by an animal rights group against the Cooperatives Working To-
gether (CWT) program for its herd retirement initiative. See generally Edwards v.
Nat’l Milk Producers Fed’n, No. C 11-04766 JSW, 2014 WL 4643639 (N.D. Cal.
2014).  CWT is the joint effort of several dairy cooperatives to create and execute
programs aimed at increasing the price of milk and stimulating improved market
conditions for dairy products. Id. at *5.  Participating cooperatives include some of
the largest in the country, such as Dairy Farmers of America, Inc., (DFA); Land
O’Lakes, Inc.; Dairylea Cooperative, Inc.; and Agri-Mark, Inc. Id. at *4.  In 2009,
as part of its larger initiative to increase milk prices, CWT facilitated a program
that incentivized farms to engage in a herd retirement program. Id. at *5. This
program paid farmers per head of cattle to send their cattle to market and agree
not to reenter the dairy farming business for at least one year. Id. The plaintiffs in
this case alleged that defendant CWT artificially inflated and manipulated the
price of milk and other dairy products because of this supply management practice.
Id. In 2016, the parties entered into a settlement agreement for 52 million dollars.
Dave Natzke, Cooperatives Working Together Settles “Herd Retirement” Lawsuit
for $52 Million, PROGRESSIVE DAIRYMAN (September 13, 2016), http://bit.ly/
2IOkurM [https://perma.cc/F5K7-4E6].  Even though the U.S. Department of Jus-
tice and the USDA vetted and approved the herd retirement program, the plain-
tiffs argued that the actual program allowed a majority of cooperatives to control
pre-production milk supply by removing cows and controlling the quantity of prod-
uct in the marketplace rather than by engaging in post-production marketing pro-
grams. Id.
114. Carstensen, supra note 52, at 487.
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cooperatives to engage in price-fixing agreements but not agree-
ments that seemingly manipulate supply.115  Courts reason that
price-fixing agreements are a type of marketing and that the Cap-
per-Volstead Act specifically enumerates marketing as a protected
activity.116  To illustrate the confusion, consider defendant coopera-
tives’ reasoning for claiming Capper-Volstead Act protection for
agreements that touch product supply:  the cumulative impact of
removing cows from the total herd numbers decreases the supply
and, therefore, increases raw milk prices.117  Courts have expressly
permitted cooperatives to enter into price-fixing agreements.118
However, courts have not provided specific guidance other than
over traditional price-fixing agreements.119
2. Qualification as a Producer
The Capper-Volstead Act’s broad and undefined terms have
also left the dairy industry’s entities unsure of who qualifies for pro-
tection.120  The Capper-Volstead Act’s language extends protection
only to “persons engaged in the production of agricultural prod-
115. Fairdale Farms, Inc. v. Yankee Milk, Inc., 635 F.2d 1037, 1039 (2d Cir.
1980).  The plaintiffs alleged that the Capper-Volstead Act did not permit associa-
tions of cooperatives—like CWT—to engage in price-fixing agreements; both the
District Court and the Second Circuit rejected this proposition. Id.  By contrast,
other courts adhere to the view that agreements manipulating the actual supply of
raw milk are not permitted. Edwards, 2014 WL 4643639, at *5.
116. See Fairdale Farms, Inc., 635 F.2d at 1040 (“The establishment of price is
an integral part of marketing.”).  Because the ability to set milk prices is consid-
ered part of the marketing function of a cooperative, the practice would not “sub-
ject a cooperative to antitrust liability.” Id.
117. Alison Peck, The Cost of Cutting Agricultural Output: Interpreting the
Capper-Volstead Act, 80 MO. L. REV. 451, 462 (2015).
118. Fairdale Farms, Inc., 635 F.2d at 1039.
119. Carstensen, supra note 52, at 487.  A decision from the court in Edwards
v. Nat’l Milk Producers Fed’n could have answered the question posed (i.e., Are
there limitations to Capper-Volstead Act protection when cooperatives with the
aim and effect to influence price engage in agreements that control supply?) and
provided clearer guidance.  Natzke, supra note 113.  As of October 2018, CWT is
still a functioning program working toward “creating new export market opportu-
nities and continuing to look for innovative ways to increase sales of milk and
dairy products for participating cooperatives.” Id.
120. Carstensen, supra note 52, at 480.  This concern is important, as the com-
plexity of cooperatives is increasing. Id. Today, cooperatives have numerous
processing plants that handle a variety of products and are often members of vari-
ous joint ventures with large food manufacturers. Id. at 479.  DFA has over
18,000-member farmers across the country, owns 31 processing plants, and is a
party to many joint ventures. Id. The problem becomes determining who qualifies
for Capper-Volstead Act immunity when a plaintiff alleges Sherman Antitrust Act
violations against the cooperative. Id.  Is only the cooperative protected, or do the
Capper-Volstead Act protections also reach the businesses and business partners
of that cooperative? Id.
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ucts.”121  Production encompasses many stages, including raising,
growing, breeding, processing, hauling, and marketing.122  The chal-
lenge lies in determining who is a producer.123  In the landmark
case, National Broiler Marketing Association v. United States (“Na-
tional Broiler”),124 which addressed the poultry market—not the
dairy industry—the Supreme Court used the Capper-Volstead Act’s
legislative history to determine that a member of the cooperative
who did not own a flock, hatchery, or grow-out facility and who
entered the market only at the final stages of production is not an
entity or person meant to receive protection under the Capper-Vol-
stead Act.125
The National Broiler case involved a complex look into the
broiler chicken market and the National Broiler Marketing Associ-
ation, a cooperative association organized under Georgia law.126
The plaintiffs alleged Sherman Act violations against their poultry
cooperative, and the defendant cooperative responded by alleging
“that its status, as a cooperative association of persons engaged in
the production of agricultural products, sheltered it from antitrust
liability” under the Capper-Volstead Act.127  Innovations in the
broiler market both improved efficiency and increased
departmentalization.128
A single, integrated entity likely owned the flock and the
processing plant.129  However, the entity itself was not physically
part of the broilers’ production, a responsibility left to the chicken
farmers who had independent contracts with the entity.130 Because
121. Capper-Volstead Act, 7 U.S.C. § 291 (2012); see also Cook, supra note
58, at 497 (explaining that those not engaged in production—i.e., a producer—are
not afforded protection and that “any cooperative with non-producer voting mem-
bers will lose its exemption” granted by the Capper-Volstead Act).
122. 7 U.S.C. § 291 (2012).
123. Nat’l Broiler Mktg. Ass’n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816, 820 (1978).
124. Nat’l Broiler Mktg. Ass’n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816 (1978).
125. Id. at 827–28 (reasoning that those individuals or entities not part of any
of the specified stages could not qualify as producers).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 818.
128. Id. at 821.  For example, eggs are no longer hatched where they are laid,
and chicks are raised in different locations than where they are hatched. Id.
129. Id. Previously, different individuals who specialized in a specific stage of
the process would control that part of production. Id.
130. Id. The broiler market worked in the following way:  the integrated en-
tity (who was a member of the cooperative) owned the flock and contracted with
independent growers for the raising and grow-out period of the chicks. Id.  The
entity hatched the chicks at their hatchery then delivered the flock to the con-
tracted independent grower. Id. The independent grower was responsible for
feeding, providing veterinary services, building the chicken barn, paying the utility
bills, hiring and managing employees, and paying other costs associated with the
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the high-level entity that merely organized the transition of the
flock from location to location only involved the type of business
investment that Congress did not intend to protect, the entity could
not receive Capper-Volstead Act protection.131
Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion in National Broiler em-
phasized Congress’s lack of intent to afford antitrust liability pro-
tection to middlemen and processors.132  The opinion raises a
concern for vertically integrated cooperatives that also own market-
ing entities and processing facilities.133  The concern is that those
vertically integrated cooperatives may lose the producer status that
affords them Capper-Volstead Act protection.134  Although Na-
tional Broiler provides an effective and clear framework for the
broiler market, key dairy industry influencers still have questions
about the definitions of dairy producers.135
3. Recent Dairy Cooperative Litigation
The 2000s have plagued the American agricultural industry
with low prices, volatile market shifts, and increased litigation.136
Two dairy industry antitrust cases have been at the forefront of in-
dustry news, as many farmers demand better practices and trans-
parency from their cooperatives in the face of extremely low milk
prices.137
In Food Lion, LLC v. Dean Foods Company,138 plaintiffs sued
Dean Foods and other dairy holding companies, alleging a conspir-
acy to inhibit competition, to restrain trade, and to monopolize the
dairy industry.139  Plaintiffs claimed that the dairy cooperative’s un-
grow-out period for the chicks. Id. When the flock grew to maturity, the entity
picked up and transported the flock to its own processing facility. Id.
131. Id. at 828.
132. Id. at 834–36.
133. Don T. Hibner, Allegations of Conspiracy to Limit Crop Production:




136. Agricultural Products Home, CME GROUP, http://bit.ly/2IM6mQ5
[https://perma.cc/SB5R-VQLC] (last visited Dec. 14, 2018) (showing the volatile
highs and lows of the milk price over the last year).
137. See Food Lion, LLC v. Dean Foods Co. (In re Se. Milk Antitrust Litig.),
739 F.3d 262, 268 (6th Cir. 2014); Allen v. Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc., 748 F. Supp.
2d 323, 330 (D. Vt. 2010); see also Weeks Interview, supra note 27 (explaining that
many farmers are frustrated with the consistently low milk prices and believe that
the cooperatives should be doing more or trying something new to increase the
price of milk).
138. Food Lion, LLC v. Dean Foods Co. (In re Se. Milk Antitrust Litig.), 739
F.3d 262 (6th Cir. 2014).
139. Id. at 268.
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checked growth through its acquisition of grocers, processors, and
marketing firms resulted in a conglomerate of entities that was able
to control the milk supply at every step and to thereby manipulate
the milk price.140  The plaintiffs alleged that these conspiracies oc-
curred via sweetheart deals, kickbacks, and preferential treatment
among the various cooperatives and their respective processing and
bottling facilities in a complicated web of mergers, sales, and joint
ventures.141
The Food Lion case turned on whether the Court should apply
the default analysis, the per se rule, or the rule of reason.142  Ulti-
mately, the Food Lion case settled, and the Supreme Court never
clarified the remaining questions and concerns about cooperatives’
unchecked power and ability to own, to operate, to buy, to sell, and
to merge with a conglomerate of other facilities.143
Allen v. Dairy Farmers of America, Inc.144 also centered on al-
legations of Sherman Antitrust Act violations against DFA and al-
leged that the cooperative unlawfully created a monopsony145 in
the Northeast by tying up the milk supply and by entering into un-
lawful supply management agreements.146  The allegations also fo-
cused on the complex relationships between DFA, DFA’s
processing plants, Dairylea Cooperative, Inc. (a dairy cooperative
that is a competitor of DFA), and Dairy Marketing Services, LLC
(DMS) (an entity that markets, processes, and hauls milk).147  DFA
and Dairylea jointly own DMS.148
140. Id. at 268–269.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 273.
143. See Eric Kroh, Dean Foods, Food Lion Settle Antitrust Suit on Trial’s
Eve, LAW360 (March 27, 2017, 4:05 pm), https://bit.ly/2lCuQ6b [https://perma.cc/
Y3P2-8KZB] (describing the case’s history subsequent to the 6th Circuit’s ruling).
The Supreme Court denied certiorari to Food Lion after the appeal of the 6th
Circuit decision.  Dean Foods Co. v. Food Lion, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 676, 677 (2014).
Later attempts to revive Food Lion and to certify it as a class action suit were
unsuccessful. See Kroh, supra note 143. These unresolved legal questions still pre-
sent concerns for farmers in today’s U.S. agricultural community. See Weeks In-
terview, supra note 27 (reflecting on dairy farmer meetings in which the common
opinion centered around the concern that these unresolved cases seemed to allow
cooperatives to manipulate the market with unchecked power).
144. Allen v. Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc., 748 F. Supp. 2d 323 (D. Vt. 2010).
145. See Monopsony, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining
monopsony power as “a market situation in which one buyer controls the
market”).
146. Allen, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 331.
147. Id. at 330.
148. Id. For clarification, Dairylea and DFA own DMS, meaning two would-
be competitor cooperatives own a dairy product marketing service together. Id.
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Farmers across the country hoped that the Allen case would set
guidelines and provide limitations on DFA’s seemingly overpower-
ing reach.149  DFA and the other named defendants won a partial
motion to dismiss, citing immunity under the Capper-Volstead Act
protections.150  Ultimately, the Allen case settled without providing
a true answer as to the limits of cooperatives’ Capper-Volstead Act
protection.151
While the courts and interested parties continue to discuss
what the unclear litigation results mean for current cooperative
practices, dairy farmers continue to suffer.152  The future of this
country’s dairy industry has reached a critical point.153  Although
the Capper-Volstead Act had good intentions and was initially suffi-
cient, its outdated language and structure has allowed dairy cooper-
atives to grow unchecked to the detriment of the member
farmers.154  An additional factor in the already-tense situation is the
dairy farmers’ claims that the cooperatives personally exploit and
ignore their members.155  Any solution to the Capper-Volstead Act
dilemma must consider dairy farmers’ frustrations and growing dis-
trust and dissatisfaction with their cooperatives.156
III. ANALYSIS
A. Capper-Volstead Act Reform
Although reforming the Capper-Volstead Act is not currently a
popular solution, modified guidelines are necessary to better regu-
late antitrust violations in the dairy industry.157  Allowing the status
quo to continue will not alleviate dairy farmer frustration or de-
crease the number of alleged antitrust violations.158
149. Weeks Interview, supra note 27.  This suit was the first challenge to sup-
posedly competing cooperatives’ being jointly-owned entities and working to-
gether to market and sell dairy products. Id.
150. Allen et al v. Dairy Farmers of America, COHEN MILSTEIN, http://bit.ly/
2IJjwgC [https://perma.cc/XXW2-P6UP] (last visited Nov. 9, 2018).
151. Id.
152. Weeks Interview, supra note 27 (explaining that the court decisions and
settlements have not changed how the cooperatives operate and that milk prices
have not improved).
153. Id.  Many dairy farms are barely making enough money to cover their
bills and will continue to shut down unless milk prices increase, costs decrease, or
new market opportunities become available. Id.
154. Carstensen, supra note 52, at 493.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 496.
158. Weeks Interview, supra note 27 (noting that more dairy farms will con-
tinue to close because of the difficulty of operating a profitable business in the
current agricultural climate).
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1. Prioritization of Each Individual Farmer’s Interests
Prior to drafting new Capper-Volstead Act language, farmers
and legislators need to determine whose needs should take priority:
the farmers’ needs or the cooperatives’ needs.159  Some agricultural
scholars and dairy industry specialists recommend developing a sys-
tem that promotes strong agricultural organizations with the free-
dom to make decisions and to implement programs helping dairy
farmers via whatever means those organizations deem appropri-
ate.160  Others in the dairy industry recommend completely restruc-
turing the cooperative program with a focus on protecting and
promoting each individual dairy farmer’s interests.161  To meet con-
sumers’ growing demand for local foods and a “know-your-farmer”
approach to food purchases, any new guidelines or regulations
should prioritize the individual farmer over the large
organization.162
Ultimately, the modern individual dairy farmer is a farmer with
whom consumers want to interface and who takes a hands-on ap-
proach to the production process.163  New legislation needs to pro-
tect this modern dairy farmer.164  The biggest form of protection
that farmers need is stable and realistic milk prices.165  A consistent
milk price would allow dairy farmers not only to support their
farms but also to invest in new technologies to improve animal care
and sustainable practices.166  Controlling and limiting the size of co-
operatives—essentially shrinking their reach and dominance over
the market—should be the priority of any new dairy industry legis-
lation.167  Without new legislation that puts the individual dairy
farmer’s prosperity first, cooperatives will continue to use their size
and market reach to manipulate milk prices in their favor.168
159. Claiborne, supra note 24, at 310.
160. Id.
161. Carstensen, supra note 52, at 493–95.
162. Weeks Interview, supra note 27.  A “know-your-farmer” approach to
food purchases involves consumers’ buying local products, knowing from whom
and from where their food originated, and learning how their food is grown and
made. Id.  More farmers are taking advantage of these types of market opportuni-
ties to make ends meet. Id.  For example, some dairy farmers have started making
and selling their own cheese or yogurt. Id. See also Carstensen, supra note 52, at
493.




167. Carstensen, supra note 52, at 493–96.
168. Id.
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2. Definition of Qualifications for Capper-Volstead Act
Protection
Though National Broiler Court defined who is a producer in
the broiler industry,169 the Court’s definition does not translate well
to the dairy industry because the industries are simply too differ-
ent.170  Affording protection to producers without clearly defining
who qualifies as a producer allows for the growth and dominance of
cooperatives.171  The next cooperative-governing piece of legisla-
tion must include a clear set of criteria that outlines who can be a
member of a cooperative.172  Furthermore, no entity that itself does
not participate in “the processing, marketing or bargaining ser-
vices” should be permitted to participate in the cooperative.173
Such legislation should follow the National Broiler Court’s
rationale.174
In the effort to clearly define dairy producers, a portion of
Congress’ consideration must focus on addressing cooperatives’
mergers and acquisitions, processing facilities, marketing firms, and
retailers within the dairy industry.175  An assumption that the coop-
eratives which currently own multiple different facilities (like DFA)
would willingly give up or sell off entities worth millions of dollars
to comply with a definition of producer targeting only individual
farmers or smaller cooperatives is unrealistic.176  However, exempt-
ing certain activities to determine which cooperatives receive pro-
tection is an unworkable and impractical solution.177  Often,
marketing and bargaining can overlap, and activities that seem like
marketing could also be categorized as bargaining.178  Granting co-
operative legal status to only those cooperatives involved in certain
activities could quickly become a similarly unclear standard and
would result in little to no change for individual farmers.179
The new dairy producer definition should account for dairy co-
operatives engaged in various activities but should also set a clear
rule specifying that entities that do not participate in processing,
169. See Nat’l Broiler Mktg. Ass’n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816, 820 (1978).
170. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
171. Carstensen, supra note 52, at 493.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See Nat’l Broiler Mktg. Ass’n, 436 U.S. at 827–29.
175. Carstensen, supra note 52, at 497.
176. Id.; see also supra note 147 and accompanying text (discussing how DFA
owns multiple facilities).
177. Carstensen, supra note 52, at 497.
178. Id.
179. Id.
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marketing, or bargaining are not producers under the Capper-Vol-
stead Act.180  Allowing subsidiaries of larger cooperatives with no
direct role in any of those activities to be classified as producers
permits dairy cooperatives to unfairly receive antitrust protection,
facilitating their growth and dominance.181  The new dairy producer
definition needs to focus on protecting only those dairy producers
directly serving the farmer members’ processing, marketing, and
bargaining needs.182
3. Stronger Role for the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture
Section 2 of the Capper-Volstead Act grants power to the U.S.
Secretary of Agriculture to monitor and to shut down dairy cooper-
atives causing severe milk price concerns for consumers.183  While
the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture has the power to monitor cooper-
atives to protect consumers from paying exorbitant milk prices,
Congress needs to expand the Secretary’s power to also allow him
to protect dairy farmers from receiving unfair milk prices.184  How-
ever, dairy farmers’ goal in challenging the current Capper-Vol-
stead Act is never to receive milk prices so high that they negatively
impact consumers.185  Dairy farmers’ goal in seeking legislative re-
form is simply to earn a livable and fair wage.186
Congress’s including § 2 of the Capper-Volstead Act indicates
that Congress intended to give the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture a
method to monitor cooperatives’ anticompetitive growth and devel-
opment.187  In other words, Congress did not intend the Capper-
Volstead Act to be an all-encompassing, free pass for cooperatives’
unchecked growth and anticompetitive business practice develop-
ment.188  Unfortunately, for a number of reasons,189 the U.S. Secre-
tary of Agriculture has never used § 2 to enforce restrictions against
180. Id.
181. See id. at 498.
182. Id.
183. 7 U.S.C. § 292 (2012); see also Fairdale Farms, Inc. v. Yankee Milk, Inc.,
635 F.2d 1037, 1038 (2d Cir. 1980).  The U.S. Secretary of Agriculture seldom uses
this controlling power. Id.
184. Peck, supra note 117, at 488.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Peck, supra note 117, at 491.
188. Id.
189. An analysis of the reasons for lack of enforcement of § 2 by the Secre-
tary of Agriculture is beyond the scope of this Comment.  For such a discussion,
see generally E. V. Jesse et al., Interpreting and Enforcing Section 2 of the Capper-
Volstead Act, 64 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 431 (1982).
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cooperatives.190  In the spirit of providing a mechanism for oversee-
ing dairy cooperatives’ participating in anticompetitive behavior,191
§ 2 of the Capper-Volstead Act needs to be reshaped to give the
U.S. Secretary of Agriculture not only the authority but also the
incentive to police dairy cooperatives.192  Without any legislative
oversight, dairy cooperatives are free to continue manipulating milk
prices for both consumers and farmers with very little risk of
consequences.193
B. Feasibility of Implementing a Supply Management Program
Dairy farmers’ frustration with a few large dairy cooperatives’
unchecked power and freedom ultimately stems from the unlivable
wage that dairy farmers receive.194  Although the dairy farming
community has never generally accepted or implemented supply
management, many dairy farmers are looking to neighboring coun-
tries’ examples and calling for the U.S. dairy industry to seriously
consider incorporating supply management practices into future
legislation.195  Basic supply management practice uses a quota sys-
tem, which allots a certain amount of milk production per farm op-
eration based on the country’s or region’s demand.196
Oversupply of dairy and other agricultural products has been a
recurring problem for U.S. agricultural producers.197  The Capper-
Volstead Act provides protection to post-production price-fixing
agreements, a form of supply management.198  However, exempting
pre-production practices under the Capper-Volstead Act could pro-
vide the relief from low milk prices that dairy farmers seek.199  Re-
190. Peck, supra note 117, at 470–471.  No U.S. Secretary of Agriculture has
ever used the power granted to him in § 2 of the Capper-Volstead Act to monitor a
cooperative, “so little guidance exists as to its meaning.” Id. at 471.
191. Carstensen, supra note 52, at 493.
192. Peck, supra note 117, at 491.
193. Id.
194. See Weeks Interview, supra note 27 (explaining that dairy farmers are
not able to make enough money to cover monthly expenses).
195. Id.  Canada’s dairy industry currently operates under a supply manage-
ment system. Id.
196. Id.  The regulating body determines the volume of dairy products needed
and allocates production limits to farms. Id. This oversight ensures that milk
prices do not drastically drop in a short period of time due to an oversupply. Id.
Ultimately, the goal is to provide a stable, consistent, and fair milk price to the
dairy farmers. Id. Further discussion of supply management practices is beyond
the scope of this Comment.
197. Yuliya Bolotova, Agricultural Supply Management and Antitrust in the
United States System of Agribusiness, 17 INT’L FOOD AND AGRIBUSINESS MGMT.
REV. 53, 67 (2014).
198. Id. at 68.
199. Weeks Interview, supra note 27; see also Peck, supra note 117, at 496.
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stricting the milk supply is not the most popular solution among
dairy farmers,200 but dairy farmers may be wise to consider such a
restriction’s price stability benefits.201
Congress taking the control of the fluid milk supply out of pro-
ducers’ and cooperatives’ hands would limit the detrimental control
that cooperatives have over the system.202  As a result, cooperatives
would not be as free to change milk prices since an oversupply of
milk would not exist; rather, cooperatives would be working with a
predetermined supply of milk that would fill the exact market de-
mand.203  Supply management principles would be a valuable addi-
tion to dairy industry regulation and would work in tandem with
revised Capper-Volstead Act language to limit the dairy coopera-
tives’ otherwise-unchallenged power to control the milk supply.204
Congress, via the USDA and U.S. Secretary of Agriculture,
needs to determine, create, and assign fluid milk quotas to dairy
farms.205  These quotas need to be realistic:  high enough to allow
dairy farmers to produce enough fluid milk to earn a sustainable
living but low enough to prevent excess fluid milk from flooding the
market.206  Congress should apply these supply management princi-
ples to the pre-production phase.207
Cooperatives should not have the power to control the supply
of dairy in the market after production.208  Cooperatives have too
many varying interests at all levels of production and cannot be
trusted to control the supply in a way that ensures fair milk prices
for dairy farmers.209  Giving the power to determine fair and realis-
tic production limits to a neutral party, ideally Congress and the
U.S. Secretary of Agriculture, would restrict cooperatives’ ability to
manipulate milk prices.210
200. Weeks Interview, supra note 27.  Dairy farmers who own large-scale op-
erations with their extended families are more often than not opposed to supply
management. Id. Their economy of scale allows them to better absorb low milk
prices by increasing the size of their herd and therefore increasing production,
sometimes milking as many as 5,000 dairy cows in one operation. Id.








209. See Carstensen, supra note 52, at 490–91.
210. See Bolotova, supra note 197, at 71.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Capper-Volstead Act, though once a sufficient control on
dairy cooperatives, is no longer functioning as Congress originally
intended.211  The Capper-Volstead Act’s failure to provide modern-
day dairy cooperatives with clear guidelines about activities ex-
empted from antitrust prosecution has allowed a select-few cooper-
atives to control a majority of the U.S. dairy industry.212  With this
control, these dairy cooperatives have been manipulating the coun-
try’s fluid milk supply as well as the milk price that dairy farmers
receive.213
Congress needs to revise the Capper-Volstead Act.214  Strict
guidelines that determine who can function as a dairy cooperative,
an outline of those activities in which a dairy cooperative can en-
gage, and a stronger regulatory power for the U.S. Secretary of Ag-
riculture all need to be part of the revised law.215  Without
Congress’ implementation of methods to halt dairy cooperatives’
monopolistic growth, dairy farmers and the health of the U.S. dairy
industry will continue to suffer.216
211. See supra Part II.E.
212. See supra Part II.E.
213. See supra Part II.E.
214. See supra Part III.
215. See supra Part III.
216. See supra Part III.
